

EXHIBIT A

TO REGISTRATION STATEMENT

Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended

Furnish this exhibit for EACH foreign principal listed in an initial statement
and for EACH additional foreign principal acquired subsequently.

1. Name and address of registrant Ruder & Finn Incorporated 110 East 59th Street New York, New York, 10022	2. Registration No. 1481
3. Name of foreign principal Government of Israel	4. Principal address of foreign principal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Jerusalem, Israel

5. Indicate whether your foreign principal is one of the following type:

☒ Foreign government

☐ Foreign political party

☐ Foreign or ☐ domestic organization: If either, check one of the following:

☐ Partnership

☐ Committee

☐ Corporation

☐ Voluntary group

☐ Association

☐ Other (specify) _____

☐ Individual - State his nationality _____

6. If the foreign principal is a foreign government, state:

a) Branch or agency represented by the registrant. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

b) Name and title of official with whom registrant deals. Moshe Arad
Assistant Director General

7. If the foreign principal is a foreign political party, state:

Not Applicable

a) Principal address

b) Name and title of official with whom the registrant deals.

c) Principal aim

8. If the foreign principal is not a foreign government or a foreign political party,

a) State the nature of the business or activity of this foreign principal

Not Applicable

b) Is this foreign principal


- Owned by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal Yes ☐ No ☐
- Directed by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal. . . . Yes ☐ No ☐
- Controlled by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal . . Yes ☐ No ☐
- Financed by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal . . . Yes ☐ No ☐
- Subsidized in whole by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal Yes ☐ No ☐
- Subsidized in part by a foreign government, foreign political party, or other foreign principal Yes ☐ No ☐

9. Explain fully all items answered "Yes" in Item 8(b). (If additional space is needed, a full insert page may be used.)

Not Applicable

10. If the foreign principal is an organization and is not owned or controlled by a foreign government, foreign political party or other foreign principal, state who owns and controls it.

Not Applicable

Date of Exhibit A	Name and Title	Signature
7/6/79	Abraham D. Peritz, Controller	

Budget Bureau No. 83-8435
Approval Expires 31. 1976
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REGISTRATION UNIT
INTERNAL SECURITY
SECTION
CRIMINAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Washington, D.C. 20530

EXHIBIT B

TO REGISTRATION STATEMENT
Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act
of 1938, as amended

INSTRUCTIONS: A registrant must furnish as an Exhibit B copies of each written agreement and the terms and conditions of each oral agreement with his foreign principal, including all modifications of such agreements; or, where no contract exists, a full statement of all the circumstances, by reason of which the registrant is acting as an agent of a foreign principal. This form shall be filed in duplicate for each foreign principal named in the registration statement and must be signed by or on behalf of the registrant.

Name of Registrant	Name of Foreign Principal
Ruder & Finn Incorporated	Government of Israel - Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Check Appropriate Boxes:

- ☐ The agreement between the registrant and the above-named foreign principal is a formal written contract. If this box is checked, attach two copies of the contract to this exhibit.
- ☐ There is no formal written contract between the registrant and foreign principal. The agreement with the above-named foreign principal has resulted from an exchange of correspondence. If this box is checked, attach two copies of all pertinent correspondence, including a copy of any initial proposal which has been adopted by reference in such correspondence.
- ☒ The agreement or understanding between the registrant and foreign principal is the result of neither a formal written contract nor an exchange of correspondence between the parties. If this box is checked, give a complete description below of the terms and conditions of the oral agreement or understanding, its duration, the fees and the expenses, if any, to be received.

The agreement between Ruder & Finn and the Government of Israel was oral. It was a spot assignment to review Israel's communications efforts in the United States. There was no fee for this report other than the cost of transportation and lodging in Israel for the Ruder & Finn representative who prepared the report.

- Describe fully the nature and method of performance of the above indicated agreement or understanding.

The report was prepared after eight days of conversations by Ruder & Finn representative with a number of people in Israel as well as conversations with Israel government personnel and others concerned with the country's communications practices in the United States.


5. Describe fully the activities the registrant engages in or proposes to engage in on behalf of the above foreign principal.

See answer to questions #4 and copy of report attached.

6. Will the activities on behalf of the above foreign principal include political activities as defined in Section 1(o) of the Act?^{1/} Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, describe all such political activities indicating, among other things, the relations, interests or policies to be influenced together with the means to be employed to achieve this purpose.

Not Applicable

Date of Exhibit B	Name and Title	Signature
7/8/79	Abraham D. Peritz Controller	

^{1/} Political activity as defined in Section 1(o) of the Act means the dissemination of political propaganda and any other activity which the person engaging therein believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, persuade, or in any other way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.

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CRIMINAL DIVISION

ISRAEL'S COMMUNICATIONS TO THE
UNITED STATES

- A REPORT -

Submitted by Charles Lipton
Ruder & Finn, Inc.
June, 1979

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INTRODUCTION

When the idea was broached of reviewing Israel's communications directed to and as performed in the United States, it had a certain amount of fascination. As the involvement grew deeper, so did the fascination. The project turned out to have many ramifications, some of which could be foreseen, others of which were a surprise. It became obvious as work progressed that many of the difficulties facing Israel communications could be solved without too much effort. All that would be required in some cases was a determination and a desire to untangle some bureaucratic webs, or to institute some newer communications techniques, or to merely inform about some recent techniques in the communications business.

Other areas were complex and would require a lot of work but were judged to be solvable in time. There were still other areas that were far more complex and became involved with politics and/or personalities. These were eliminated as substantive issues for this report since any involvement of communications in Israeli politics would be destined to failure. This does not mean that at some point in time such issues should not be addressed but that they were beyond the scope of this report.

Any effort such as this could not have been possible without the cooperation and unlimited good will of people throughout the Israeli government. In particular, the personnel of the Foreign Ministry were extraordinarily helpful both on an on-the-record and off-the-record basis. Some ideas broached in the conversations were so valuable that they are repeated practically verbatim while others are a synthesis of

several talks. Many thanks to all who participated for their time and interest in the undertaking.

The report is based upon eight days of conversations involving over 40 people in Israel as well as conversations with Israel government personnel and others concerned with the country's communications practices in the United States. By no means should this report be considered a complete analysis of their communications techniques. Rather it should be contemplated as an overview of many practices and as an insight into several areas of operations that deserve to be changed. A thorough analysis of the communication techniques, both in Israel and in the United States, would involve a research and audit project which would take several months to complete and cost well over \$100,000. Since that is not practical, the insights and observations in this report will have to suffice at this time.

This report deals exclusively with Israel's communications with the United States since approximately one-half of Israel's communications budget is spent there. It is hoped that the observations and recommendations in this report can be helpful and perhaps be applicable not only to the United States but also in other areas of the globe, particularly in the English-speaking and more advanced technological nations.

PREFACE

In any public relations program there are two considerations that are paramount -- who and what. Who is doing the work and what's being done. But before analyzing these topics there is a fundamental question that Israel should resolve -- the distinction between information and propaganda. There is a lack of understanding as to the difference

between these two which serves to interfere with the effectiveness of many worthwhile projects. Projects designed to provide information and educate can create an impression that can form the foundation on which effective propaganda techniques could later be directed, if and when the need arises. There are many worthwhile projects being carried out which should be clarified as to whether they are information or propaganda. The distinction would make their implementation much easier.

Some of the projects involved with Jerusalem are excellent from an information point of view; they are not political -- they are instructional. By implication they point up the virtues of the city as it's presently governed, but they are not blatant in their message nor strident in tone. An excellent example of this is the multi-screen show on Jerusalem currently being shown in the City Museum as well as in New York, the beginning of an American tour. Its initial reception in America was excellent. It should be seen by all concerned with improving Israel communications because it shows how an effective message can be projected without stridency.

On the other hand, the material put out by the Foreign Ministry on the Arabs, material such as that entitled 'What They're Saying' is propaganda. This material is designed to create an immediate impression in a harsh, strong tone. It is out-and-out propaganda. It is in its own way as effective as some of the more subtle information projects being implemented.

The point is that in any communications program there is a need to understand this distinction. The educational and informative program will be able to achieve a much greater degree of success in America in the present political climate. Unless and until this distinction is understood, many efforts could be wasted. It is comforting to note that most of those

engaged in Israel communications understand the distinction, but until all do, there will be some unnecessary obstacles presented in the way of an effective program.

TRAINING

In making any suggestions it would be very easy to say that much of Israel's problems could be overcome if there were another \$1 million to spend -- which would increase the budget some 40 to 50 per cent. This would be simple but impractical. Consequently, the recommendations that have been suggested are ones that have been considered within the present budgetary framework. They involve a redeployment of the money already assigned to Israel's communications efforts; the details of which can be worked out if there is agreement on the recommendations.

No communications effort can be implemented without competent personnel. Considering that Israel's communications people are, for the most part, not trained in this area, it is remarkable that the country has achieved the degree of public relations success that it has. To rely on foreign ministry and information division personnel to produce continuing programmatic results is like playing dice at Las Vegas -- the odds are against you because of the assignment process. Nevertheless, there is sufficient knowledge on the part of the people currently involved in Israel's information efforts so that meaningful projects can be suggested and implemented. Israel and its friends should therefore be grateful for the dedicated intelligence and knowledge of this handful.

The most obvious recommendation, in terms of information division personnel, would be to suggest that the Government change its practices

In this area and institute an operation similar to the USIS. Through such a department, information personnel could be trained in the various techniques necessary to accomplish results and rotated in the same manner as are government people throughout the world. Such a suggestion, however, would not be practical. What is necessary therefore, within the confines of the present Governmental system, is more attention to the selection process and subsequent training.

Recognizing that the selection process is beyond the scope of this report but merely wanting to take note of it, the subject of training becomes even more important. Others have mentioned the need for training, and specific suggestions have been made. Unfortunately, the problem is that training takes time and money. What is happening, however, is that time and money are being wasted by involving people in the communications practice who spend half their tour of duty learning and the other trying to implement and/or further their knowledge, with the net result that Israel's Information program runs at approximately 50 per cent effectiveness.

Information people assigned to the U.S. have a particular problem because the U.S. is the most advanced communications country in the world, both from a technological as well as breadth points of view. Therefore the need to train them is essential. Such training of newly assigned personnel could take place in Israel by those who are familiar with the U.S. and also in the U.S. by those assigned to it who are familiar with the country.

Many suggestions have been made including:

- a) overlap the tours of duty of the new and the old personnel.

This could cost some money but would no doubt be one of the most effective methods;

- b) new people assigned to the U.S. should be sent for a short time, perhaps a month or two, to one of the country's communications schools such as those found at Boston University, Syracuse, Northwestern, etc.;
- c) ask the country's friends at leading public relations firms to provide indoctrination for new people. This would probably be the least effective but would be better than no training at all.

In particular, there is a tremendous need for the training of Israel communications personnel in the audio-visual arts. Israel is oriented to the written word while the American derives the bulk of his information from the electronic media. The differences between the two are vast, and therefore the need to bridge the gap is vital. This is the singular area of training to which the Israel Government should begin to address itself.

PROGRAMMING

The second major area is that of programming, the projects which constitute the Israel communications effort in the U.S. Before considering some specific suggestions, an overall recommendation is that a more sophisticated programming process be instituted.

There are many worthwhile projects currently being implemented, but there are also others that are being carried on only because of historical inertia or because they are deemed worthwhile by one or two personnel.

What is called for is a cost-effective analysis of every project currently being carried out to determine the following:

- a) What is its objective?
- b) Who is it designed to reach?
- c) Is it accomplishing a and b?
- d) How much does it cost?
- e) In view of c and d should the project be continued within the strictures of an assigned priority system and budget limitations?

If this were done, there is no doubt that millions of pounds would be found that were currently not being spent in an effective manner and which could be diverted to areas such as the audio-visual where there is a great need for increased activity.

In short, sophisticated programming can husband and make more effective the Israel communications budget.

From a programmatic point of view there are three basic areas that should be discussed: Audiences, Media and Projects.

I. AUDIENCES

1. Jew vs. non-Jew -- The impression that is received after conversations throughout the government is that the prime audience for Israel in the United States is the Jewish population. Various estimates indicate that 70 to 80 per cent of the total effort is directed at Jews. As the saying goes, "that's gilding the lily." The people who are Jewish generally do not have to be convinced as to the virtues and attributes of the State of Israel. It's the other 214 million Americans who should be the audience. Currently

only 20 to 30 per cent of the effort is being directed at the non-Jewish audience (97 per cent of all Americans.)

The task is not Jewish opinion but American public opinion. The general public is harder to reach than the Jewish population, but it's where the effort must be aimed. It's much harder to effect a change of opinion or to achieve a positive effect in Middle America than it is to impress a Hadassah or B'nai Brith convention.

It is apparently inbred within the system to concentrate efforts on behalf of Jewish groups. The report by a consul that states he made 20 speeches to Jewish organizations is in many cases better received than the one that shows only 6 addresses to non-Jewish groups.

Quantity, however, is not the answer. Quality, geographic location and the content of the effort aimed at the non-Jewish public should be the judgment and will be more effective for Israel. The Jewish organization network in the U.S. receives enough attention from their own apparatuses in Israel as well as from the overall umbrella of the Jewish Agency. There may be some unhappy Jewish organization executives or some loud outcries when the Hadassah chapter in Norwalk, Connecticut is unable to get a speaker from the consulate, but the support of Israel on the part of members of the group is not going to be lessened because they didn't get a speaker. On the other hand, if the Norwalk Rotary were to have a speaker, some new support for Israel might be achieved which could be most important in the future when it may be needed.

There will be results achieved from addressing non-Jewish audiences, if there is a continuous, consistent effort. Prior achievements in this area show it can be done.

Results will only be achieved if there is firm direction and supervision in this area. The recommendation -- consuls must be instructed to list the various non-Jewish organizations of consequence in their area (such as business, labor, religion, civic, women, educational, scientific, agricultural, etc.) They should then submit a plan as to how they would propose speaking to these groups. After approval of the plan, they should begin their approaches to the groups. Follow-up reports must be provided on a regular basis so that successes, or the lack thereof, could be noted, and if need be, better guidance provided. The reports should indicate how many groups were contacted, what the general reaction was, was the reception favorable or unfavorable, were they interested in hearing a story, what happened when the speaker went there, was the group interested, did they ask good questions, did he think it was a good audience, did the local press interview him, what kind of a story appeared, etc.

In the same manner that more non-Jewish groups should be contacted, so should non-Jewish publications be the objective of more attention. The Anglo-Jewish press receives more communications than it can ever hope to print in its columns from various sources in Israel, and the additional efforts of the consuls could be considered non-productive. And let us not forget that the Jewish population is part of the general populace. Addressing a group such as Rotary or the Harvard Alumni Association will reach a segment of Jews as does the article in the NEW YORK TIMES or the MISSOURI BANKER.

Another method for reaching a certain segment of the Jewish population, including the Hebrew speaking, in America would be for Israel to

avail itself of the Israel Broadcasting Authority's short wave broadcasts. It already has the equipment, the program, the personnel to effect a continuing flow of information to America. The show format to overseas audiences is one with which many in Israel are familiar -- only certain techniques would have to be adapted for this procedure to be instituted. Unfortunately, a small group of technicians is unwilling to work the hours necessary to beam broadcasts at America during the desirable listening times. This problem has existed for quite a while and appears to be unresolvable. If an overall communications program to America is considered essential to the Israeli Government, it would seem that this difficulty could be resolved -- quietly, quickly and justly.

2. Class vs. Mass -- Much, if not too much, of Israel's communications whether it is in the form of publications or people hours, are directed at what might be known as the intellectual. The intellectual is, to be sure, important in affecting a certain segment of American public opinion. The suggestions made are not meant to denigrate the importance of the intellectual but to stress that there is too much effort directed at the intellectual and not enough to the mass of the American public. To put it another way, if intelligence alone governed American public opinion, the current president of the United States would not be Mr. Carter. The intellectual may be the one that the Israeli enjoys talking to, but he alone is not going to determine whether Israel enjoys American support.

Much of Israel's efforts are spent in producing publications that are beautiful to look at and interesting to read, but whose distribution is extremely limited and whose influence is confined to a relatively

small group. The American public is not influenced by "coffee-table" books but by material that is aimed at the high-school graduate. The Israeli communications network has got to understand how to reach not only the college professor but also the blue-collar worker. Material must be aimed at this audience if the overall effort is to be effective.

3. Israel/American efforts -- In the same manner as too much of the activity in America is directed to Jewish groups, too much activity in Israel is also directed at the organized Jewish/American structure. More attention must be paid to organizing Israeli speakers or groups to appear before the non-Jewish audience rather than to make a tour of some 30 Jewish organizations. Again, of course, such an effort may be more difficult but would no doubt be more worthwhile in the future. The combined efforts of personnel in the Operations Section, the Scientific, the Cultural Division and the Center for Relations with the Public appear to be overlapping and uncoordinated.

A closer look at these activities -- from a cost-effective point of view -- could well result in combining some of these efforts with resultant savings in personnel and money. This suggestion is in no way meant to downgrade the efforts of these Israel communications personnel but to suggest that more effective results could be achieved by better analysis and planning.

Further this suggestion does not apply to speaking tours organized for a specific purpose, such as for UJA, Bonds for Israel, etc.

II. MEDIA

1. Electronic Media -- On the wall of the Diaspora Museum there is a saying, "Make Thy Books Thy Companions." In five years there hopefully will be another saying on that wall -- "Make Thy Electronic Media Thy Friends."

If there is one great drawback throughout the entire Israel information apparatus, it is the almost complete lack of comprehension and understanding that in America, it's television that governs public opinion. Various surveys indicate that some two-thirds to three-quarters of the American populace receives its news from TV. Because of Israel's lack of appreciation of this medium, the country stands to let others utilize it to their advantage.

To oversimplify the problem would be to state that the Jew believes that the only thing more convincing than a 3,000-word article is a 5,000-word article. Unfortunately, all television news is disseminated in 60 to 90 seconds with an occasional two to three minute feature news clip -- and the average person speaks around 125 words per minute.

Besides being able to adapt news stories to television news, there are also segments of stories on Israel life, concerned with such subjects as solar energy, medicine, agriculture, etc., which can be shown to the TV audience. Some of this might be related to "Israel Reports," a film service that produces material under contract from the Foreign Ministry, primarily for organizational use. It does good work. Its material is used. Its effectiveness, however, could be immeasurably increased if it produced materials designed for television showings. For example, if shows are

produced of 23-minute length (one half-hour showing time in America), there is time for commercials to be inserted. Further, the film should be produced in three or four minute segments so that local stations can insert the commercial or so that each segment could be shown individually. That's how the message can get exposure.

As in print media, the location of the TV station could govern its interest in content. For example, stations in the Southwest might be interested in solar energy, while those in Boston might prefer the Israel Philharmonic.

If the word "film" was used before, forget it. Film isn't used; tape is, videotape, and the footage is put on a cassette. Example: Walk into any significant television station in America today carrying a can of film and say to the man, "I've got a great film in here; it has the greatest advances on solar energy that anybody in the world has achieved." And the fellow will say, "What have you got it on?" And if you say "film," he'll say, "Leave it with me. I'll look at it sometime." Why? He has to go to a room where there's a 16 mm. machine, see if it's available, rack up the clip, all taking extra time. On the other hand, there isn't a major television executive in America today who is in the position of accepting or rejecting tape that's brought to him who doesn't have a videocassette player in his office. If you bring him the same footage on tape, he takes the tape and simply puts it in his machine. It's immediate and as easy as putting a key in a door. He puts it in, you look at it with him, and he says yes or no, or it's great; I'll consider it, or whatnot. But you're sure he's looked at it, because he's got the machine right there and you're

giving him something that hopefully he can use.

One can try to sell film today to television and sell it from here to Doomsday, and it's not going to work. They're not buying film; they're buying tape. Israel is beginning to understand that, but the country is way behind. At the end of May of this year, the Israel Information Bureau acquired a VTR. It can record. The Bureau was smart enough to buy equipment that uses both the European and American systems. Unfortunately, the country is still years behind in its understanding of the use of tape and its technological considerations. And as the saying goes in America, it's going to have to play fast catch-up football.

Aside from producing good material in Israel for use in the United States, there is a need to establish a good distribution network. Some attempts have been made to do this in the past, and currently there is an investigation proceeding as to how a system can be developed for future use. The object of the system would be to provide the best possible exposure for Israeli-produced material in well-viewed time periods. This is not going to be easy -- it may cost some money -- but its success is vital to the proper utilization of television.

All of the discussions about TV and its use will be just that -- discussions -- unless Israeli personnel, trained in TV, are available to work in the medium. The use for a training program was mentioned earlier. Certainly TV should be a major segment of any such curriculum.

Another method that might be used to both speed up the process of securing good material for TV use and to be able to attract trained personnel on a continuing basis would be the establishment of an Audio-visual

Center, paralleling the work of the Israel Information Center. This Center produces good work on a continuing basis in the print media field. Its use of language is good. Its knowledge of graphics shows in many of its projects and it completes its activities within budget and on a generally accepted time schedule (albeit sometimes a bit slow.) The adaptation of such a technique should be investigated for the audio-visual field because it could solve many problems both of time and substance.

If there's any message that should be emphasized in this report, it is contained in this section. Israel must understand and utilize TV to its maximum effectiveness. The Government has the intelligence to implement such a plan. It shouldn't let politics and bureaucracy impede progress.

2. Radio -- The other electronic medium -- radio -- is utilized very well in America and has proven cost-efficient. It should be monitored to make sure that its effectiveness remains on the same high plane that it is today.

3. Films -- The films Israel is producing, such as those for "Israel Reports," should be continued. Their use beyond their current distribution should be pursued and work is being conducted to determine such feasibility. As mentioned earlier, the adaptation of these films for TV or tape should be considered. The conversion can be done in New York by hiring a studio for an hour or so. There will unfortunately be some loss of clarity from film to tape but modern technology will insure approximately 90 per cent quality.

A small point -- the Foreign Ministry is involved in some film production, often depending on other governmental departments for assistance. There apparently have been on an occasion or two, some bureaucratic snafus that inhibit the proper answering of requests for footage. These should be eliminated since one assumes that all governmental operations are on the same side and have the same purpose when it comes to influencing opinion.

4. Feedback -- Throughout the entire Israeli communications system, there is a lack of complete knowledge about results of various efforts. There is a need to "close the loop." Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of media. Stories appear in the U.S. without those responsible for their origination being informed. U.S. personnel must be instructed to send clippings to Israel promptly. Not only should stories be sent back but also, when important issues are the subject of articles, the entire page(s) containing the article should be mailed so that an analysis can be made of their particular type of placement within the publication.

There is also a lack of feedback when journalists as well as others visit Israel. Again this involves a lack of "closing the loop." For example: consuls are sometimes not involved directly in issuing an invitation when an American journalist from their area visits Israel. Consequently, personnel in Israel often neglect to inform the consul about the content and results of the trip. This obviously inhibits the consul's ability to function in the most effective manner in dealing with that journalist in the future.

Another example of a lack of the organizational feedback process concerned a group of Dutch Senators who visited Israel as official guests of the country. The loop was so far from being closed after the Dutch returned home that it was one month before any contact was made by Israel's Embassy in the Netherlands. And then the contact was only made because one of the Senators came to the Embassy to thank one of the officials for the courteous treatment received while the group was in Israel. What a lost opportunity!

Another form of feedback that should be instituted is the reporting by consuls of differences within America. America is so big and diffuse in its likes and dislikes that much effort is wasted by trying to use uniform material throughout the country. Trends and/or styles are often different in the Northeast as opposed to the Southwest. Consequently, much material being sent from Jerusalem to America does not achieve maximum use because it is not directed at what's "in." Consuls should be trained to periodically, perhaps every quarter, send information to Jerusalem as to what types of cultural, fashion and living styles are paramount in their areas. This could be particularly helpful to the material created by the Jerusalem Features operation, which, despite a uniformity of feedback, produces good results. With better information, its effectiveness could be improved.

It is interesting to note that the Jewish Agency, which is really just starting an information program, has organized a committee consisting of three executives assigned to different geographical areas to receive

periodic reports on the effectiveness of the material being used as well as to provide recommendations as to what types of material should be utilized. As the saying goes, "A word to the wise should be sufficient."

5. Government Press Office Photo Archives -- Unfortunately, these archives are located in Tel Aviv, while the majority of the people who might make use of them are in Jerusalem. Perhaps in time the geographical distance might be eliminated. Meanwhile, the location does hinder the use of the archives by Jerusalem-based information personnel.

The photos in the archives are good. They may not win awards in photographic exhibits but they are certainly of the quality that can be used with the material written by information personnel and being published in the American press. In addition, there is a good catalog system so that finding a suitable photograph for a specific purpose should not be difficult.

The archives should be used more extensively. Perhaps information people could, on a periodic basis, go to Tel Aviv and participate in a session on the content and catalog methods of the archives. The archives consist of material taken by government photographers for a specific purpose or to record an event.

6. Propaganda Archives -- There is apparently a lack within the government structure of material which highlights the misdeeds, terrorist tactics and inequities of the Arab Governmental systems. Such material, if available, could be very worthwhile for Israel information and propaganda purposes. There is, for example, nothing in the archives showing photos

of the Arabs committing terrorist deeds or acts of injustice which could be utilized to illustrate certain articles.

In the Information Division, a reference file of both articles and photos on this subject, culled from the world press, should be established. Further, there is a lack of files on Arab propaganda, either from Arab nations or others. As with photos, such material could be used by foreign ministry personnel in their activities with foreign correspondents in America, as well as those with whom U.S. consuls maintain contact.

Perhaps the Center for Political Research could establish a simple retrieval system which would enable foreign ministry personnel to obtain copies of Arab propaganda for use in articles they are writing.

7. Local American Photo Archives -- Some consuls in America have photo archives and utilize them; others either don't maintain them or don't consider this area as part of their activities. It is recommended that each consul maintain a photo archive that could be used by local press, radio and organizations on a request basis. The consuls should be sent photographs from Israel periodically to insure that their files are current and newsworthy.

8. Center for Political Research -- This Center, in addition to the use mentioned above, could be used effectively on a continuing basis by the Information Division. There is currently no formalized liaison between these two operations. Such liaison could well provide the Information Division with various new sources of material that could be valuable in the development of currently planned material as well as

perhaps providing the catalyst for developing some new types of information. It would of course be useful if there were an individual in the Information Division who spoke Arabic but better to establish liaison than wait for somebody who knows that language.

9. Journalists' Missions to Israel -- The four-times-a-year missions to Israel of U.S. journalists is an excellent idea. It has produced some fine results and also, no doubt, has made a number of good friends for the country.

The results, however, could be improved if a somewhat different methodology of selection was used than the current one. Now, various consuls in America are asked to indicate which media representatives would like to go, with some concentration to areas where they may have been difficulties.

The result is that those who have gone on the last couple of missions represent a mixture of newspaper, radio and magazine personnel, with the vast majority coming from the East, South and West.

Incidentally, the segregation of TV crews from these missions was a good move and has allowed such crews when they come to Israel to receive the particular type of attention they deserve.

Two suggestions are offered which hopefully would improve the effectiveness of this project:

- 1) Segregate those on the missions by the types of media they represent. Example: one mission could be exclusively radio; another magazines; a third newswriters, a fourth editorial writers. In such a manner, the programming of

activities could be made simpler and hopefully more interesting to the participants;

2) more attention should be paid to geographic areas where there is a need for general support of Israel, primarily the Mountain States and the Middle West -- Denver to Pittsburgh. This is the area where Israel needs better support. Utilize the concept of the missions to assist.

This does not mean that the coastal areas, New York and Los Angeles, should be neglected, but merely that the priority for invitation be changed, with emphasis placed on cities where support is lacking or needs reinforcing.

10. Media Selection -- All too many Israelis, including many in the Government, think that American media begins and ends with the NEW YORK TIMES and WASHINGTON POST. While these may be two, if not the two, most interesting newspapers in America, they are not the only ones that mold public opinion. They should not be neglected and their correspondents and executives should continue to be given good attention. However, a balance should be attained so that other media, particularly the wire services -- AP and UPI -- receive attention. A favorable news or feature story five inches in length that will appear in anywhere from 500 to 700 papers will perhaps have a better cumulative benefit to Israel than a story three times as long in the NEW YORK TIMES.

The salient point from a political point of view is that Israel often overlooks the political picture of America. There is a lack of realization

that the two Senators from Wyoming and Idaho cast as many votes as the Senators from New York and California.

11. Editorial Advisory Board -- There are many editors, electronics media executives, etc. who are friendly to Israel. These would include not only those who have visited the country, but also those who are just biased towards it -- both Jewish and non-Jewish. The idea would be to form a group of them into an Editorial Advisory Board, who could, on an annual basis, review the material that was being sent by Israel to America and/or the material utilized by consuls in America. This would not include news of a fast-breaking nature. In their review of the material the expectation would be that some good suggestions would emerge and that those who made suggestions for a particular type of article or feature film could then well be the target of such an effort. The mechanics of organizing and working with such a Board should not be difficult and could easily be provided.

III. PROJECTS

1. Exhibits -- There have been some nice exhibits produced for use in America, primarily of a photographic nature dealing with such subjects as Jerusalem and Life on a Kibbutz. Unfortunately, the exhibits are not of a major stature when competing with others soliciting for the prominent halls in America. As a consequence, they are not booked to advantage and find themselves all too often in out-of-the-way Jewish centers or Y's -- this despite the fact that some of the exhibits cost \$25,000 to mount and maintain, plus additional funds for shipment from one place to another and proper insurance.

Rather than strive to produce a couple of such exhibits a year, the thinking should be revamped to center on a concept of launching major exhibits -- one of which could well be on the order of Tutankhamen. On a continuing practical basis, however, concentration should be on the objective of sending one major exhibit to the U.S. per year on a subject in which Israel has recognized prowess and where the exhibit would be shown in well-known, highly trafficked museums and/or halls.

Such exhibits could well cost \$200,000 to \$300,000 and might take many months to mount. The methodology for success is simple: Secure an American business partner who, in turn for the recognition that they will receive as the sponsor of the show, would guarantee to defray the cost. There are many leading American companies who do just that. These include: Philip Morris, Champion, Springs Mills, Clairol, and so forth.

There is an excellent example of how this could be done in connection with a currently planned project entitled "Man and the Desert." This exhibit as it is presently contemplated consists of a series of photographs. To do this would be a waste and a lost opportunity. Such an exhibit could have tremendous impact if done in the right manner. It could show Israel off to great advantage if done properly:

- a) The Desert Research Institute in Beersheba should be the technical resource and the group for the contracting of the exhibit, not the Foreign Ministry.
- b) A precis of the exhibit should be prepared and placed in the hands of those who are knowledgeable in museum exhibit planning.

- c) This group should solicit corporate sponsorship from a company such as TRW, which has done work in desert-connected areas. The question of the Arab boycott may arise in connection with corporate sponsorship. This might be a hindrance but not a deterrent.
- d) Once the sponsorship is secured, museums should be contacted and a timetable arranged so that four to six leading institutions will schedule the exhibit for a month to two months, over the course of a year.
- e) In each city where the exhibit appears there should be major fanfare and publicity because the exhibit would merit such attention.

In the same manner as an exhibit on a technical subject can be arranged, one dealing with cultural life of a major nature could be done in cooperation with a company like Manischewitz. Others are doing just that, including governments. The best example is the projected "Age of Alexander" which will appear in America in late 1980 as an endeavor of the Greek Government funded in its entirety by TIME magazine.

2. Major Event -- Israel should not only rely upon events that take place to produce good recognition for the country. It should plan a major happening that by its design will result in heavy media coverage for the country. Such an event could well be a conference or other gathering of leading notables to discuss a subject of worldwide importance. Several suggestions have been made along these lines in the past without any discernible action. These ideas should be reviewed and thought given to

implementing the concept because of the benefits it can produce. This obviously is a project that would require much thought and expense but the results could well be worth it. (Reference is made to projects mentioned in the report submitted last year.)

3. Graphic Presentation -- Much of the material that emanates from Israel or its consuls is well done. However, overall there is a need for "better packaging." In some situations this has been achieved, such as in the series of small booklets extracted from the volume FACTS ABOUT ISRAEL. Looking at them, one can readily see that they are a part of a series and all deal with aspects of Israeli life.

On the other hand, you have two booklets called "Jerusalem" and "Flora and Fauna," which are supposed to be part of the same series but have no similarity to one another.

Another set of comparisons -- there is the booklet "Aspects of Israel" which is excellent. It is well-written, attractively designed and displays its contents in a very readable fashion. Conversely, some of the material produced by the IDF which, while well-written, is so badly produced that it seems almost amateurish. One cannot xerox information and photos of a feature-type nature and hope that they will get the same readership and attention as a well-designed brochure.

With a little more care being paid to the eventual use of the material, a better reception could be received because the presentation would be up to today's U.S. graphic standards. There is ample help available to provide guidance in this area and budgetary requirements should not be such that they would be prohibitive.

4. A Lost Opportunity -- Recently there was a great show at one of America's leading department stores, Bloomingdale's, in New York and also at 14 of its branches in the Northeast. The show was on Israel's consumer products together with exhibits of Israel culture and history. It was a joint effort of the Israel Economic Institute and various Israel companies. The show was so good that its original stay was extended and the NEW YORK TIMES saw fit to run a feature story, commenting in a highly favorable fashion.

There was only one thing missing. There was no information available about the country -- no inexpensive, but well-designed, handout that could have served to provide some form of written material for those interested. It is true that there might have been a lot of waste. Some schoolchildren might have taken it and then thrown it on the floor. It is also true, however, that many might have seen fit to read some of the information and been further influenced.

There should be better correlation between various sections of the Government when such a show is being planned so that opportunities for disseminating information in a favorable atmosphere are not overlooked.

5. Israel Information Center -- As mentioned, the Israel Information Center produces good material. It has a showroom on Jaffa Road with material available in different languages. This showroom is not as well-utilized as it might be. Information about the availability of materials could be circulated to various tour groups and hotel concierges so that when people asked if information were available on a particular subject, they could be referred to the showroom as a source. Based on conversations, this technique should work.

6. Meetings -- A decade or so ago, the advertising business in America came up with a gimmick -- the creative committee meeting. The idea may well have been overdone but the premise of getting people together to produce better ideas is a valid one. The interchange of concepts, the addition of one idea upon another, could be helpful to any cause, whether commercial or political.

Unfortunately, there is not as much day-to-day contact among those engaged in various aspects of Israel communications including those within the Information Division, as there should be. There are meetings, perhaps one or two per year, between the Washington minister and his Jerusalem counterparts. Such meetings should be quarterly and extended periodically to include a broader representation of those working in America and those working in Israel. Such meetings could well be expensive both in terms of time and money, but the results might be very favorable. Too much material is being produced in a vacuum, too much information is not being fed back, too much tension is being generated, not to believe that meetings could be beneficial. They should be tried on a practical basis, a large one; at least once every year or year-and-a-half so that during everyone's tour of duty in the U.S., there would be an opportunity for information interchange.

7. Xeroxing -- Another form of interchange is the ability of personnel engaged in the same activities to see results with the objective of improving the service. An easy way of doing this would be to produce copies of articles or other materials for distribution to both Jerusalem and Tel Aviv personnel where only one copy has been received. Unfortunately,

there is some sort of restriction on the duplication of material which makes such copying impossible. Consequently, other techniques are devised which take more time and money and therefore defeat the purpose of economic stringency. Such copying restrictions should be relaxed so that the efficiency of the department is not hindered while sufficient controls are still maintained so that abuses do not occur.

The availability of the material would not only increase the speed with which answers could be given but also improve the quality of the work because of the greater knowledge that would be available.

8. Foreign Correspondents -- Israel is blessed with a disproportionately large concentration of foreign correspondents. Approximately two hundred form the basis on which news of Israel is disseminated throughout the world. Their importance, therefore, can not be overestimated. Investigation, however, shows that some of the methods and techniques of handling this group are less than logical and at times border on the ridiculous.

Primarily, there should be concern with the methodology for handling foreign correspondents, either those resident in Israel or "parachutists" (those who come for a short visit.) The current system works but the question arises as to whether it could not work better. The difficulty, and there is no desire to become involved in the politics of the situation, arises because of the split responsibility for foreign correspondents in the course of their activities. The Government Press Office is, in the majority of cases, responsible for the manner in which the foreign correspondents are treated in Israel and the dissemination of information to them while there. On the other hand, the Foreign Ministry is responsible for maintaining good relations with the media in the country of origin of the foreign correspondents.

One of the aspects of the difficulty has to do with obtaining proper feedback to "close the circle," to insure that everyone concerned with the correspondents is aware of the needs and opportunities that arise. This is not to say that there is a continuing difficulty, but to indicate that there is a lack of a formalized system to take precautions so that there is no neglect of any opportunity. For example, a visiting journalist might well indicate a particular area of interest while on a trip to Israel. This area of interest must be communicated to the consul responsible for the correspondent in his native land so that the interest can be cultivated to Israel's advantage. While this has been done in many cases, it should be done in every case to maximize the benefit provided by the correspondent's interest. The good-will and the desire to achieve good relations on the part of all those working with the foreign correspondents can insure maximizing their interest if there is also constant attention paid to consistently "closing the circle."

A number of correspondents were talked to on an individual basis without the knowledge of any Israeli official. They were asked what was good, what was bad, and their general opinions about Israel's handling of them and their associates. Their comments are noteworthy:

- a) To a person, they indicate that Israel is unexcelled in the technical aspects of providing arrangements. They are generous in their praise of all concerned with this aspect of their often harassed existence.
- b) Conversely, they are devastating in their criticism of Israel's understanding of the concept of a continuing favorable information flow -- and they speak from experience in many lands under both favorable and unfavorable conditions.

The phrase was used -- on a variation of Gresham's law --
"Good information drives out disinformation."

The point is that Israel does not understand how to control questionable material. The point was illustrated in the following manner: Beirut issues a story that Israel is shelling southern Lebanon and provides the coordinates as to where the shells are being fired from. When asked for comment, the IDF's answer is either that they have no comment or that it's an exaggerated story. There is a lack of understanding how to counter such a story. Without getting involved in the specifics it could be indicated that it is impossible to designate coordinates or they could be in a fishpond or a bus station. In other words, Israel's responses to accusations is many times less than effective.

c) It would be easy to use the IDF as a whipping boy.

The correspondents recognize that a country such as Israel must protect its security, but there is a very strong feeling on their part that too many personnel concerned with dealing with correspondents are basically Intelligence Officers, who like lawyers, find it very easy to say no. A better manner must be found to relate to correspondents -- the manner taught in communication textbooks.

d) The cadre of correspondents is aggravated by what they feel is a lack of understanding of the job of the foreign correspondent. The most recent example deals with the handling of a NEW YORK TIMES correspondent when crossing the Allanby bridge who, as many know, wrote a less than favorable story based on his own experiences. With one phone call, it is conceivable that the problem and the article might have been avoided. Again, there is a system and a methodology that could be advantageous without compromising security.

e) There is a lack of understanding of the opportunity to create a good story, a favorable environment for Israel on many important items of a news nature. Three examples were mentioned:

- 1) the oil well situation a few months ago;
- 2) the Terry Fleener sentence reduction;
- 3) the autonomy issue.

Comments on the Fleener situation indicated that the opportunity to show Israel's willingness to be generous was overlooked. The story was handled in a straight news fashion (concurrent with the meeting with the correspondent.) The observation was that a propaganda advantage had been lost by the methodology used. No one except an Army spokesperson was involved, and no one who really understood the opportunities for showing Israel as a country that was willing to provide amnesty in certain situations spoke to correspondents. Even if political factors were a consideration, there should have been a better methodology used.

The autonomy issue, one considered to be the foremost involving Israel at the moment is, the correspondents feel, being mishandled. They recognize that their requirements are not paramount in the discussions but they think that Israel is losing many favorable opportunities by not providing them with a communications channel that is directed at their needs.

"Why," they ask, "does Israel not realize that the giving out of information can in many cases slant stories strongly to their side?" "Why," they ask, "does Israel complain about the story that appears in the foreign press when they don't provide the mechanism for originating good stories?" It was not a question of content that was on their minds but one of structure and methodology in releasing the news by personnel not trained to the needs of the correspondent.

f) Timing of materials -- Many of the materials used overseas by consuls are seen by the foreign correspondents. Obviously, however, the system is not foolproof in that several pieces of literature referred to earlier had not been seen by the correspondents. The system used should be checked to be sure that either through the mail or in correspondents' mailboxes every piece of information issued by the Foreign Ministry and other departments is distributed. One correspondent mentioned that purely by

accident he had found a brochure on Arab military strengths in the Foreign Ministry, containing information that he had been trying to get from the IDF for two weeks. The brochure should have been distributed to all correspondents, but it hadn't been for unknown reasons. In addition, the correspondents should be made aware of the existence of the Israel Information Center's showroom and its content of material so that they can make use of it whenever necessary.

g) Press conferences are an important technique to disseminate news, but such conferences should only be held when news is of value and when proper planning, even on short notice, has taken place. Unfortunately, there have been some situations where correspondents have driven from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv and been kept waiting for a couple of hours, only to be told that there was no conference. As one said, "An abuse of power can take place only so often without a reaction."

These opinions were from correspondents representing different sections of the U.S. All of these people would be considered pro-Israel. Therefore their suggestions should be taken as being designed to be of help rather than merely to criticize.

As an attempt to show the concern of the Government for the welfare of the correspondents, it might be well for some senior government official, not normally engaged in contact with them, to meet with a group on an informal off-the-record basis from time to time to try and resolve these

issues as well as others that might arise. At the very least better contact and understanding between the correspondents and the Government would be achieved.

h) One final point in connection with correspondents -- and a hard one for an American to understand. It appears that Israel does not believe in buying drinks of whisky, vodka or gin for correspondents. The country will buy all the wine one desires, but not hard liquor. This policy has led to a number of devious practices as well as some incidents which on reflection are humorous but at the time of their occurrence were probably quite embarrassing to Israeli officials. It just isn't appropriate that a restaurant waiter collects money for drinks from a group of correspondents at a dinner given by the Israel Government. It was fortunate that the official in charge of the party stopped the practice. Hopefully, this ill-advised policy will be rescinded and drinks allowed to be bought in a reasonable manner, but not to the extent of \$80 bottles of scotch being sent to correspondents' hotel rooms.

IV. INFORMATION DIVISION PERSONNEL

As is well-known there are many operations within the Israel Government concerned with disseminating information to the United States. One official counted some 21 bodies. One of the key ones, if not the most important, is the Information Division of the Foreign Ministry. Because of this importance, some suggestions are offered as to how the performance of this group could be improved.

As has been previously mentioned, there are many excellent individuals within this division. However, in the same manner as has been suggested in connection with projects, the organization of the division should be subjected to a cost-efficiency evaluation. Primarily, there is a strong feeling that there are changes that could be made which could be beneficial. For example: the division could be reorganized into two major functioning areas -- one dealing with printed material and the other with audio-visual and electronic media materials. Much of the work of the division falls into these two general categories and efficiencies could be realized if personnel were assigned if there were only these two major areas. Further, with the introduction of a more efficient and better organized feedback system, there is the possibility that some of the personnel currently assigned to the Operation's division could well be assigned in other areas where better programming would indicate a high priority of need.

Again, it should be emphasized that these suggestions are in no way meant to be critical of the people currently engaged in these activities but merely to indicate how a better operation could be achieved within budget and operating limitations.

A new development within the Information division has interesting aspects for the better dissemination of information. This relates to the assignment of personnel, in addition to functional areas such as publications or audio-visual, to the province of becoming an "in-house" expert on some aspect of Israeli life. There is currently such an expert on Jerusalem, which assignment has resulted in some effective work on behalf of the city. The concept could well be extended to include such areas as agriculture, medicine, technology, etc. These "experts" could be the source of information for all concerned with the communications process thereby saving much time and effort on the part of others.

V. CONCLUSION

This report has not focused on programmatic suggestions or the content of Israel's messages to America. By design, it has concentrated on the procedures, policies and style of Israel's communications to America. Several of the recommendations could well be adapted by a simple phone call; others might require some lengthy discussion before any possibility of implementation. The hope is that none of the recommendations will find themselves embroiled in politics or with personalities which might prevent their accomplishment.

The five major recommendations of this report hopefully will show signs of implementation in the near future. Certainly it is hoped that they will form the basis of immediate discussion. They are:

- 1) Cost-efficiency analysis of projects, information division organization, and other operations that have information involvement in the Foreign Ministry;
- 2) Training, including feedback;
- 3) Increased use of television;
- 4) Higher concentration of activity toward the non-Jewish populace;
- 5) Better information flow to foreign correspondents in Israel.

Discussions indicate that there is a desire for change because there is a recognition of the need for change. Certainly some of the current communications practices give the impression that Israel is fighting its struggle for public opinion with one hand tied behind its back. This must change. It is no secret that the Arab world is beginning to

understand and research the need to cultivate American public opinion. If it's not familiar enough to do it itself, it will hire professional communicators to do this work -- and this is already being done by some of their countries.

Israel with its limited resources of both money and personnel must make sure that in this struggle it does not sacrifice effectiveness for the sake of precedence. It must look to the future, not to the comforts of the past. It must today maximize every effort by utilizing modern techniques and the best available personnel.

Israel must realize that it can't just sell what it wants to sell but that it must sell what the American public is willing to buy.

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